Price controls lead to misallocation of goods and encourage rent-seeking. The misallocation e¤ect alone is enough to ensure that consumer surplus is always reduced by a price control in an otherwise-competitive market with convex demand if supply is more elastic than demand; or when demand is log-convex (e.g., constant-elasticity) even if supply is inelastic. The same results apply both when rationed goods are allocated by costless lottery among interested consumers, and when costly rent-seeking and/or partial de-control mitigates the allocative ine¢ ciency. The results are best understood using the fact that in any market, consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal revenue curve.
Introduction
Price controls and rent controls, though clearly ine¢ cient in competitive markets, do increase consumer surplus in the short run. Over the longer run, consumer surplus falls for three reasons. The …rst, emphasized in every textbook, is that long run supply is reduced-indeed some textbooks'analyses focus exclusively on this as a reason why consumers might lose from price controls.
1 The second reason, discussed since at least Friedman and Stigler (1946) but rarely emphasized until Luttmer (1997, 2003) , is that the available supply will not necessarily be allocated to those with the highest value.
2 The third reason is that non-price allocation mechanisms can lead to costly rent-seeking behavior, such as queuing, lobbying and search costs. So under what conditions do price controls reduce consumer surplus?
We show that if output is allocated randomly among those prepared to pay more than the controlled price and if supply is more elastic than demand, then a price control always hurts consumers if demand is convex (e.g., linear, log-linear, etc.). Even with completely inelastic supply, total consumer surplus falls whenever demand is log convex (constant elasticity is one example).
Furthermore, these results are una¤ected if rent-seeking a¤ects the allocation. Though rent-seeking leads to more-e¢ cient-than-random allocation, the costs it dissipates mean a price control is guaranteed to hurt consumers under the identical conditions. 3 Splitting the market between controlled and uncontrolled units also makes no di¤erence to these results. Even though all the highest-value consumers can consume, the results are the same (although the magnitudes of con-1 For example, the analyses in Taylor and Weerapana (2007, p193) and Boyes and Melvin (2010, p518-9) , which are widely-used textbooks in US universities and colleges, simply assume e¢ cient allocation without discussion.
2 Lott (1990) , Luttmer (2007) , and Palda (2000) discuss allocative costs in the context of minimum-wage legislation; and MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975) , Braeutigam and Hubbard (1986) , and Davis and Kilian's (2011) careful recent study analyse the costs of restricting new potential consumers' access to the natural gas market. A clear exposition of the standard theoretical analysis of these "allocative costs" is in Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005) . 3 We show below that there are (other) conditions under which rent-seeking does change the sign of rationing's e¤ect on consumers' welfare, and its quantitative importance depends on the distribution of consumers'costs of rent-seeking; our results also depend on these costs being uncorrelated with valuations, as we also discuss later. 1 sumers'losses are, of course, a¤ected). 4 Finally, while there is always a windfall gain to incumbent consumers, these gains are often small. For example, below-market rents are typically phased in over time by rent freezes rather than cuts, and turnover in rentals is on average very high. So even when controls raise surplus in the short run because of the incumbent e¤ect, and even though a gradual implementation of rent control will also mean a slower decline in the value of the marginal rental seeker, the mis-allocation e¤ect alone can quickly cause a net loss in consumer surplus.
Existing analyses fail to note that consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal-revenue curve up to the market quantity in an uncontrolled market-even in a competitive market. More generally, when goods are rationed, total consumer surplus equals the sum of the values to consumers of the units they receive less the sum of their marginal revenues.
5 These facts are the key to the development and interpretation of our results.
One caveat is that our analysis ignores distributional issues-even when price controls reduce aggregate consumer surplus, they redistribute it among consumers.
We begin in Section 2 by assuming that output is allocated randomly among those willing to pay more than the …xed price, before extending the model to address non-random allocation. Section 3 considers the e¤ects of rent-seeking, of partially-controlled markets, and of secondary markets. Section 4 illustrates our analysis by solving our model for a class of examples that includes the standard constant-elasticity, log-linear, and linear demand curves, and Section 5 concludes. 4 Examples of partially controlled markets include Manhattan real estate (where some units are either rent-controlled or rent-stabilized while others are available to the highest bidder), and the British healthcare system (where a small private market coexists with a National Health Service which approximates random rationing since healthcare professionals are roughly uniformly distributed across the population).
5 For example, if the inverse demand curve were p = 100 q and so M R = 100 2q then a consumer with a value of 70 (and so M R of 40) and a 50 percent chance of receiving a unit would account for :5(70 40) = 15 in consumer surplus, and aggregating across all consumers in this way correctly calculates total consumer surplus, even though the measure cannot be used for determining the amount of consumer surplus that goes to the individual consumer (which, of course, also depends on the market price).
The Basic Model: Rationing by Lottery
Consider a competitive industry with a demand curve D(p) formed by a density of consumers D 0 (v) 0 with unit demand at value v, 6 and a supply curve S(p):
We assume S 0 (p) 0 (that is, no "backward-bending" supply). We also assume that demand is …nite at all p > 0; and that its elasticity at all prices above some …nite price is bounded strictly below 1. This condition ensures that total consumer surplus in an uncontrolled market that clears at price p (that is,
(So, for example, constant-elasticity demand with inelastic demand is ruled out. 7 ) We assume in Sections 2.1-2.2 that if a regulator sets a price p below the market clearing level then demand is randomly allocated among consumers with value p. This is the standard assumption made in, for example, Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005) , but we will relax it in subsequent Sections of our paper.
So consumer surplus at the controlled price, CS(p), equals consumer surplus if the market cleared at p; times the ratio of supply to demand, S(p)=D(p) :
Measuring Consumer Surplus using Marginal Revenues
For any quantity in any market, price times quantity equals total revenues equals the area under the monopolist marginal revenue (M R) curve. Therefore, if all consumers with values above p are served, consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the marginal revenue curve, in any 6 We discuss the extension of our results to demands in which consumers individually have downward-sloping demand curves in Section 3.
7 Our assumptions also ensure that a monopolist's problem is well-de…ned-although our model is a competitive one, we will see below that the demand conditions we develop can be related to the conditions that determine a monopolist's rate of pass-through. market, including our competitive one. So we can rewrite (1) as
since D 0 (v) is the density of consumers with a value of v:
8 Di¤erentiating with respect to price yields the change in consumer surplus due to a small price cut:
is Marginal Consumer Surplus, that is, the increment in total consumer surplus in an uncontrolled market caused by a price reduction that leads to a one unit increase in quantity, while
The intuition is trivial: with random allocation of a …xed number of units, consumer welfare is proportional to Average CS, which of course declines if Average CS > Marginal CS. If supply falls with price, that only reduces consumer welfare further. Now any log-convex demand curve has the same M CS(p) as the loglinear demand that is tangent below it at p (because
And the log-convex demand clearly has higher ACS(p) (since it has weakly higher D(p) everywhere). But ACS(p) = M CS(p) for any log-linear demand, because M CS(p) is constant for log-linear demand
Proposition 1: When a rationed good is allocated randomly, consumer surplus is always reduced by a tighter price control if demand is log-convex. 8 We can derive (2) directly from (1) using M R (v) v + D(v)=D 0 (v) (the derivative of total industry revenue vD(v) with respect to quantity D(v) in an uncontrolled market with price v):
9 Our subsequent analysis is based on equation (2), but this Proposition can be obtained directly from (1): di¤erentiating with respect to price yields CS
dv is also log-convex (see, e.g., Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, Thm 4 
Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the analysis. Fig. 1A measures consumer surplus conventionally, as in equation (1). Consumer surplus at the market price p M arket is the heavily-shaded area, and the e¤ect on consumer welfare of reducing price to a controlled level p
Control would be the sum of areas A (the bene…ts to existing buyers) and B (the bene…ts to new buyers), if supply could expand from D(p M arket ) to meet the new level of demand D(p Control ). So with random allocation of demand, the average consumer surplus per consumer served equals the average height of the whole area formed by both the shaded areas together.
So Fig. 1A su¢ ces to show that if demand is su¢ ciently "fat-tailed", then average consumer surplus is decreasing in the price control, so rationing hurts consumers. But Fig. 1B tells us how fat-tailed.
In Fig. 1B we have drawn the M R curve onto Fig. 1A . Because, of course, the area under the M R curve up to D(p M arket ) equals total revenue at that quantity, the labelled areas satisfy X +A1+Y = A1+Y +A2+Z. So X = A2 + Z; and the heavily-shaded areas in Figs 1A and 1B are therefore equal and both represent consumer surplus at the market price, p M arket . Likewise, the area under the M R curve up to D(p Control ) equals total revenue at that quantity, so the sum of the heavily-and lightly-shaded areas in Figs  1A and 1B are also equal and would both represent consumer surplus at the controlled price, p Control , if all the demand at that price could be satis…ed. The lightly-shaded areas in Figs 1A and 1B are therefore equal as well, and represent the incremental welfare from reducing the price if supply could expand to meet the incremental demand.
10 So if the average height of the heavily-shaded area exceeds that of the lightly-shaded area in Fig. 1B , i.e., ACS(p) > M CS(p), then Average CS falls, and therefore total consumer welfare also falls, even with no fall in supply.
Finally, since M CS(p) = p M R(p), consumers are hurt by price controls if marginal revenue is steeper than demand, that is, for any log-convex demand, such as, for example, constant-elasticity demand.
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10 Of course only area B of the incremental consumer surplus goes to the new purchasers; the area A + B = (A1 + A2) + B = C + B is the amount of surplus gained by all consumers when price falls by enough to attract D(p Control ) D(p M arket ) additional purchasers. 11 Though the market we are modelling is competitive, our condition for a price reduction to hurt consumers (ACS(p) > M CS(p), or equivalently demand is log-convex) also has simple monopoly-theory interpretations: it is the condition for the constant-marginal-cost monopolist, that would set this price, to generate greater consumer surplus than pro…ts (because its per-customer pro…t
Elastic Supply
Dividing the right-hand side of (3) by S(p)=p yields
So if the elasticity of supply is greater than or equal to (the absolute value of) the elasticity of demand, consumers always lose if M CS(p) < 2ACS(p). But every linear demand curve satis…es M CS(p) = 2ACS(p) (since M R is twice as steep as demand), and the linear demand curve that is tangent to any convex demand curve at p has the same M CS(p) and lower ACS(p). So we have Proposition 2: When a rationed good is allocated randomly, consumer surplus is always reduced by a tighter price control if supply is locally more elastic than demand and demand is convex.
So a pass-through rate of 50% or more in a competitive industry with convex demand would imply consumers lose from a price control. (In a competitive market, pass-through = [elasticity of supply/(elasticity of supply + jelasticity of demandj)].) Campa and Goldberg's (2005) study based on exchange-rate changes estimates short-run and long-run pass-through for 23 countries at .46 and .64, respectively, and other studies using exchange-rate changes obtain similar results. Results such as these suggest that whether a small regulated price cut would bene…t consumers is likely to vary from market to market. 12 also the condition for such a monopolist to pass through > 100% of any (marginal) tax or cost increase (because its pass-through rate = dp dM C = dp dM R = slope of demand slope of M R (Bulow and P ‡eiderer, 1982) and it is easy to see from Fig. 1B that if the slope of demand (always) exceeds that of M R, then ACS(p) > M CS(p)). Weyl and Fabinger (2009) show the pass-through result extends to a very broad class of Cournot oligopoly contexts; see also Weyl and Fabinger (2011) , and the 2008 version of our current paper. Our result is also analagous to Spence's (1975) result that a monopolist over-or under-provides quality depending on whether the marginal value of quality is higher for the marginal or the average consumer.
12 Oligopolistic industries may have lower pass-through than competitive ones, so these results may understate average pass-through in competitive markets and so overstate consumers'expected bene…t from a price control.
Economists tend to assume demand is convex, although relatively little is known about actual functional forms-see, e.g., Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008) and the references they cite. 6
Incumbent Consumers vs. Newcomers
Thus far we have focused on the long-run distributional consequences of price controls. But for durables such as rental apartments the ine¢ ciencies created by a price control will phase in gradually, so even if new tenants receive less consumer surplus on average after controls are implemented, there is a group of incumbents who receive a windfall transfer from the lower prices. Following Glaeser and Luttmer (1997) , we can model this by assuming that if supply with a price control is S and demand is D then the S buyers with the highest values buy with probability + (1 )S=D while the remaining D S buy with probability (1 )S=D (so if = 1, the rationing is perfectly e¢ cient). Clearly if enough of the supply is allocated e¢ ciently, and without any reduction of supply, consumer surplus must rise. However, the conditions for consumer surplus to fall still do not seem onerous. An argument paralleling that of the previous subsection (see Appendix A) shows that for any convex demand, consumers always lose from a small price cut below the uncontrolled market price if supply is at least 1+ 1 as elastic as demand; or for any logconvex demand, if supply is at least 1 as elastic as demand. And we show in Appendix B that with demand of constant-elasticity ; and (any functional form of) supply with elasticity '; consumers always lose from a small price cut below the market price if > '+1 ' .
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Furthermore, this model assumes prices are immediately reduced when the control is announced. More commonly, price controls are phased in only gradually by restraining price increases to below-market rates. Also, turnover is on average high in markets such as that for rental accommodation. Both these things reduce the relative importance of the incumbents'windfall.
14 So even when controls raise surplus in the short run because of the incumbent e¤ect, the misallocation e¤ect alone can quickly cause a net loss in consumer surplus. We illustrate this in Appendix C. 13 Appendix B also generalises the allocation process further by assuming an additional fraction of supply is allocated as ine¢ ciently as possible above the controlled price-this case is obviously extreme, but Glaeser and Luttmer (1997) point out, for example, that longtime residents may have greater access to, but less desire for, rent-controlled apartments, than transients.
14 A gradual implementation of price control does also mean a slower decline in the value of the marginal consumer, but some consumers with lower values than the current price jump in straight away to capture the expected gains from being an incumbent in the future.
A Model of Rationing with Rent-Seeking
Our basic model in which all consumers who wish have an equal chance of being able to buy at the controlled price, with no additional search or rentseeking costs, is a special case of a more general model in which consumers expend "e¤ort"competing for the rationed good:
Let each consumer have a marginal cost of e¤ort drawn from an arbitrary distribution, independent of the consumer's value. (We will generalise this later.) A consumer's probability of purchase is proportional to the e¤ort it makes. Competition determines the probability of purchase per unit of e¤ort expended: if E is the sum of all consumers' e¤orts, then E=S(p) of e¤ort earns one unit. So a consumer who has marginal cost of e¤ort c chooses e¤ort E=S(p) if his value v p+cE=S(p); and expends no e¤ort (and does not buy the good) otherwise. This condition determines the total e¤ort, E, expended in equilibrium, and hence the equilibrium allocation of the goods.
15 '
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Let n(v) be the expected quantity per consumer bought by consumers with value v, and cs(v) be the expected surplus per consumer of these consumers, in equilibrium.
The standard mechanism-design argument [see, e.g., Myerson (1981) ], using the envelope theorem, then tells us dcs=dv = @cs=@v = n(v). (Since each consumer chooses its e¤ort, and so purchase quantity, optimally, each of n(v) consumers with values v + dv obtains dv more surplus than the otherwise-identical consumer with value v who obtains a unit, but the total surplus of the additional dn consumers with value v + dv who would not have purchased units if their value were just v is second order.) Also cs(p) = 0, so cs(v) = R v p n(x)dx.
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15 To see equilibrium is generally unique, observe a proportional increase in anticipated E yields the same proportional increase in e¤ort for those consumers who still purchase, but reduces the number of purchasers, so yields a smaller than proportional increase in actual E.
16 Since our risk-neutral consumers want at most one unit each, nothing would change if we assume a single unit is allocated to each of the S(p) consumers who make the greatest e¤ort. (Technically, there is then no equilibrium if consumers make simultaneous e¤ort choices, but the outcome in the text is the equilibrium if consumers make sequential choices; it is also the limit of equilibria of discrete versions of the simultaneous game.) 17 The function n(v) itself depends on p, but we suppress this dependence for notational simplicity. Also note that supply
Integrating across all consumers, total consumer surplus at price, p; is
so, integrating by parts and observing
18 we have
for the marginal revenue at value v of a monopolist on the demand curve D(v); as before, therefore gives us
which is just the generalisation of our result in equation (2) above. From consumers' point of view, rent-seeking costs simply increase (by di¤ering amounts) the "e¤ective price"s they face. The fact that the rent-seeking part of these e¤ective prices is a social waste is irrelevant to them. So, just as before, total consumer surplus can be computed by summing the values less the marginal revenues of all those who actually purchase. Figure 1B illustrates this. Total consumer surplus is just the integral of the shaded area but with each strip of height v M R(v) (and of width equal to the density of consumers with value v-i.e., D 0 (v)) is weighted by the total number of units, n(v); that bidders with value v get. Thus Figure 1B /equation (4) allows the computation of consumer surplus knowing only the probabilities with which di¤erent types of consumers receive units. (Of course, a consumer's own per-unit surplus is not equal to the height, v M R(v), of "its"strip-the calculation applies only in aggregate.)
By contrast, the corresponding integral of the shaded area in …gure 1A measures consumer welfare only in our Basic Model (section 1), and not in our General Model, since only the random-allocation case can arise without rent-seeking activities; the height, v p, of type v's strip in …gure 1A shows its per-unit gross surplus ignoring any resources it spends to increase its probability of winning above that of a consumer of value p.
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The implication is that if the demand curve is always steeper than the M R curve, so (d=dv) [v M R(v)] > 0 (and also M CS(p) < ACS(p)-see Figure 1B -so demand is log-convex), then any transfer of probability from a higher-v consumers to a lower-v consumer reduces consumer welfare.
Furthermore, a tighter price control always results in some high-v consumers being displaced by low-v consumers, and not vice versa (because the equilibrium amount of e¤ort required to obtain a unit is increased, so highv consumers who did not buy previously are more disadvantaged relative to any low-v consumers who did and who must therefore have lower rentseeking costs). So, since any supply response only reduces consumer welfare further, 20 we can generalise Proposition 1:
Proposition 3: When a rationed good is allocated by rent-seeking, consumer surplus is always reduced by a tighter price control if demand is logconvex.
Conversely, if (d=dv) [v M R(v)] < 0 everywhere,so M CS(p) > ACS(p)
, then a price control that does not cause a supply cut must increase consumer surplus. Because rent-seeking costs that are uncorrelated with values cannot lead to more substitution of high-v by low-v consumers than in a random allocation, no distribution of rent-seeking costs can yield greater consumer surplus than a random allocation at the same price. This can arise when at least the fraction S(p)=D(p) of consumers have zero costs of rent-seeking; since no rent-seeking costs are then actually incurred, this corresponds exactly to our basic model of random rationing in Sections 2.1-2.2. 19 However, this integral,
show the consumer surplus that could be achieved by an informed principal who could allocate higher probabilities to favoured types unconstrained by any need to impose greater costs (either through the price charged, or through deadweight rent-seeking activities) on the favoured consumers. (In the same way, the revenue of an ordinary monopolist-including one that sets di¤erent prices at which consumers can buy goods with di¤erent probabilities-is the sum of the M Rs of the consumers it sells to, but the revenue of a monopolist that can somehow price discriminate costlessly is the sum of the maximum willingnesses-to-pay of the consumers it sells to.) 20 The e¤ect of a price cut can be divided into the e¤ect which would occur were supply inelastic, and a supply e¤ect. The latter e¤ect always reduces consumer surplus (by the sum of v M R > 0 across all the consumers it displaces, since no consumers buy as a result of the supply e¤ect who would not buy in its absence).
Note that because rent-seeking increases the e¢ ciency of the allocation (less substitution of high-v by low-v consumers than in a random allocation), it reduces consumers'losses from rationing when demand is log-convex, but reduces their gains from rationing when demand is log-concave and supply is inelastic.
In the extreme case, if all consumers have identical costs of rent-seeking activities, the available supply is e¢ ciently allocated to the highest-value consumers, exactly as in an uncontrolled market, but (with inelastic supply) the entire price reduction is eaten up by the rent-seeking activity-so consumer welfare is una¤ected. (And if there is any supply response at all, the "e¤ective price" to consumers rises-that is, more than the entire price reduction is eaten up by the rent-seeking activity, and consumer welfare is reduced.)
So with log-convex demand a price-control is always bad news for consumers, though less so with rent-seeking, while with log-concave demand rent-seeking reduces any bene…ts to consumers. 
Elastic Supply with Rent-Seeking
With inelastic supply, and either log-convex or log-concave demand, rentseeking always dampens but never reverses the e¤ect on consumers of imposing a price-control. But the supply response to a price control (which always hurts consumers 22 ) is, of course, independent of whether or not there is rent-seeking. So, when demand is log-concave and supply responds to price, the overall e¤ect on consumer surplus may turn from positive with random rationing to negative with rent seeking.
We can therefore generalise our earlier proposition about any convex demand (including mixtures of log-concave and log-convex) when supply is elastic. To do this, note that since
If demand has both a log-concave section and a log-convex section at higher prices, then rationing with rent-seeking may help consumers even when random rationing would hurt them, if new consumers displace low-v low-M CS consumers, but would displace a mixture of these and higher-v higher-M CS consumers with random rationing. For example, with su¢ ciently inelastic constant-elasticity demand at high prices, linear demand at lower prices, and su¢ ciently inelastic supply, we can …nd market-and controlled-prices on the linear part of demand that lower consumer surplus with random allocation, but raise it if half of consumers have no rent-seeking costs while the other half have identical (positive) costs.
22 See note 20.
if p > e p. Combining this fact with the method we used to show Proposition 2 of considering the linear demand that is tangent to any given convex demand at the market price, allows us to extend that proposition to show (see Appx D)
Proposition 4: When a rationed good is allocated by rent-seeking, consumer surplus is always less than in an uncontrolled market if supply is more elastic than demand between the uncontrolled market price and the price control and demand is convex.
Observe, however, that this proposition discusses only the total e¤ect of a price reduction from the market-clearing price (so is only a partial generalisation of Proposition 2). The reason is that the amount by which rent-seeking increases the allocation e¢ ciency can vary substantially as the controlled price changes.
23 So the rate of change of the non-supply consumer bene…ts from rationing, and therefore the extent to which they can outweigh supply e¤ects, can also vary substantially as the price control changes. 24 So it is not true that any marginal tightening of an existing price control necessarily makes consumers worse o¤ under the conditions of Proposition 4. 
Partially-Controlled Markets
Our results are una¤ected if only a fraction of inelastically supplied goods are sold at a controlled price, while the remainder are sold on the free marketbecause allowing consumers to pay a price premium for an uncontrolled unit is equivalent, from their point of view, to selling all the units at the controlled price but capping their rent-seeking costs. (The cap would be such that in equilibrium a consumer's total rent-seeking costs of obtaining a unit would be not more than the (equilibrium) di¤erence between the controlled price and the free-market price.)
A special case is a market in which some units are sold at a controlled price without any rent-seeking costs (i.e., using a costless lottery), while the rest are sold on the free market. From a consumer surplus point of view, this corresponds exactly to a fully controlled market in which some consumers (those who would succeed in the lottery) have no rent-seeking costs, while the others, who correspond to the buyers of free market units, all have equal, positive costs. Those buyers then clear the market at a total cost of e¤ort plus controlled price which equals what would be the clearing price for the de-controlled units.
Likewise, our results generalize further to cases where, as in cities such as New York, price controls vary by unit, with some units at the minimum controlled price, some at higher but still constrained prices, and some at unconstrained prices. One can think of the units being sold o¤ for varying packages of money and search e¤ort, with each consumer acquiring whatever is cheapest for him given his cost of e¤ort (see Appendix E).
In all these cases, consumer surplus can still be calculated as
, that is, the integral of (value minus M R) weighted by the number of consumers of each value who will receive a unit. The integral of M R alone (with the same weights) is the sum of the moneys consumers spend on controlled plus uncontrolled units plus the value of the rent-seekers'e¤orts valued at the costs the rent-seekers themselves attribute to these activities. 
Rent-Seeking Costs Correlated With Values
If consumers with higher values for the good have higher costs of e¤ort, this can obviously reduce welfare further. If the distributions of e¤ort costs for consumers with higher values for the rationed good …rst-order stochastically dominate the distributions for lower-value consumers, then consumer surplus must be lower than if all consumers' costs were drawn from any common distribution (independent of value) that yields the same allocation of the good. 27 Of course, if e¤ort costs are proportional to (v p), then consumer welfare at the rationed price, p, is zero.
Conversely, if higher-value consumers have lower costs of e¤ort this increases welfare. However, only if all consumers whose values exceed the uncontrolled market-clearing price can acquire units with zero e¤ort costs will we obtain the traditional textbook outcome with neither misallocation nor rent-seeking costs.
Other Extensions
A range of other generalisations and extensions of our results are straightforward.
It is trivial to generalise from our model in which each consumer has a constant marginal cost of e¤ort (drawn from some distribution) to one in which consumers have general cost functions for e¤ort (drawn from a set of cost-of-e¤ort functions). Exactly as before we let n(v) be the expected quantity per consumer bought by consumers with value v, 28 and cs(v) be the expected surplus per consumer of these consumers, in equilibrium, and the envelope theorem tells us dcs=dv = @cs=@v = n(v), for the same reasons as before, etc., so the results are identical. This case, too, can be extended to consumers with di¤erent values having di¤erent distributions of cost-of-e¤ort functions.
We have modelled demand as comprised of consumers who have di¤erent values for a single unit each, 29 but the same results apply when demand consists of consumers who have downward-sloping demands that are identical, 27 Let the distribution of type v's e¤ort cost be F v ( ). Assume the type, b v(c), which purchases if and only if its e¤ort cost c, is strictly increasing (otherwise there is in general no common distribution that yields the same allocation of the good). If
changes neither the allocation, nor the aggregate e¤ort expended by the set of consumers of any type, but reduces the aggregate costs of the e¤ort expended by every such set of consumers. 28 Parallel to our basic model of rent-seeking, write E for the anticipated sum of all consumers'e¤orts. A consumer who has value v, and cost-of-e¤ort function c(e); chooses an e¤ort, e, that maximises (eS(p)=E)(v p) c(e) s.t. eS(p)=E 1: Since a larger E yields an e=E that is lower for all consumers, and strictly lower for some, there is a unique E for which the integral over all consumers of e=E equals 1, as required for equilibrium. This E yields a unique distribution of e¤ort levels (consumers mix if their optimal choices are not unique) and a unique equilibrium allocation, n(v):
29 Examples might include rental housing, healthcare, and minimum wages.
or proportional to each other. (As before, consumers have di¤ering constant "e¤ort" costs, and competition determines the equilibrium quantity of e¤ort required to obtain one unit of the good, so it also determines each consumer's per-unit e¤ort cost and the e¤ective per-unit price the consumer faces.) To see why the results are unchanged, observe that constraining the market price is equivalent to breaking the market into submarkets, each of which is identical or proportional to the others, but each of which has a di¤erent "e¤ective price" corresponding to its consumers'equilibrium per-unit cost of e¤ort. So if total quantity is …xed, making the change from an uncontrolled price (so search costs are zero for all, and e¤ective prices are identical) to a controlled price (so search costs and therefore e¤ective prices di¤er) reallocates some units from higher-value to lower-value uses. So consumer welfare is reduced if p M R is decreasing in price, that is, if demand is log-convex. Also as before, we exactly replicate Section 1's lottery model if a fraction S(p)=D(p) of consumers has no rent-seeking costs (or alternatively the complementary fraction has in…nite costs). In this case each consumer is either fully served at the controlled price or not served at all, so the ine¢ ciencies and welfare losses result from overconsumption by those lucky enough to be served. Supplies of natural gas are an example (see, for example, Davis and Kilian's (2011) recent study). 
Secondary Markets
With inelastic supply and frictionless resale, consumers weakly bene…t from any price control, because the secondary market price will equal the original market price and some consumers will get units more cheaply. These consumers essentially earn a middleman's pro…t by "reselling" to themselves, but others will enter the market purely to resell. If the initial allocation is by a costless lottery, the sum of consumer and reseller surplus equals the consumer surplus in the simple Econ 1 diagram which assumes costless e¢ cient allocation. But rent-seeking by middlemen can compete away all their profits, and (with inelastic supply) e¢ cient resale will then recreate the market allocation, that is, fully undo the e¤ects-whether positive or negative-of any price control.
If consumers have di¤ering costs, independent of their values, of participating in the resale market-e.g., legal evasion costs, if the market is "black"-resale will still improve upon a random initial allocation, but it will not be fully e¢ cient. The …nal allocation may be less e¢ cient than would occur with rent-seeking and no resale. So the entry of additional middlemen combined with an ine¢ cient secondary market might reduce both aggregate buyer value and aggregate surplus.
Example
We illustrate our results for the standard distributions of demand-including linear, log-linear, constant-elasticity, etc.-in the class of Generalized Pareto distributions (GPDs). For GPDs
1= ( = 1 gives linear demand, ! 0 gives log-linear demand, and = = > 0 gives constant elasticity demand with elasticity 1= . 31 ) We write (=
) for the elasticity of demand at p: We do not restrict the functional form of supply, but write ' for its elasticity at p.
Demands in the GPD class have the useful property that
E¤ect of a Price Control: From equation (4) total consumer welfare is
Equivalently, writing v and M R(v) for the expected value and the expected M R, respectively, of consumers who get units,
is a¢ ne in v for GPDs).
31 Our model requires < 1 so that consumer surplus is …nite. As ! 0 the GPD becomes D(p) = ke But, writing c for the expected amount per-unit spent on rent-seeking (priced at the cost to the consumers who expend the e¤ort), we can also write
So the e¤ect of a small tightening of a price control on aggregate consumer welfare is
Welfare E¤ects with No Rent-Seeking: With random allocation without rent-seeking c = dc dp = 0, so consumers gain from a tighter price control if and only if > '.
Welfare E¤ects with Rent-Seeking: With rent-seeking we know from Proposition 3 that consumers must lose from any tighter control if 0, and it is clear from (5) that consumers'total surplus is always lower with rent-seeking than without if < 0. So the conditions for consumers to gain from any price cut from the market price are always tighter with rent-seeking than without, in this class of demands.
Welfare E¤ects of Partial Decontrol: Because M R(v) is a¢ ne in v for GPDs, the mathematics of partial decontrol are the same: in this case, p is the average cash price paid for units, including both those controlled and decontrolled. So from (5), when supply is inelastic, the average "e¤ective total price" to consumers, p + c(p); is a su¢ cient statistic for the e¤ect of rationing on them, that is, the e¤ect of any change in cost to purchasers is independent of whether it is due to a partial control, or a change in rent-seeking, or both. 32 32 However, the amount of rent-seeking generally depends on the distribution of controlled prices, not just on the average price, p, and supply may do so too. So S, S 0 , c 0 , and hence CS 0 (p), generally depend on how this distribution changes.
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Conclusion
Price controls lead to ine¢ cient allocation and rent-seeking, in addition to reduced supply. Even absent any supply e¤ect, ine¢ cient allocation may cost consumers all the surplus gains they receive from a lower price and more. The results apply whether the good is allocated randomly through a lottery without rent-seeking costs, or whether greater search and other rent-seeking activities undertaken by higher-value consumers results in a more-e¢ cientthan-random allocation. The results also apply when only some units are allocated at below-market prices, while other are sold on the free market. In short, and especially if supply is fairly elastic, it is unlikely we can be con…dent that consumer surplus is enhanced by any price control.
Appendix
A. More-E¢ cient-than-Random Rationing with No rent-seeking in the General Case
At the market-clearing price, a $1 price cut increases consumer surplus by $1 for each of the S(p) e¢ ciently-allocated units, so (3) becomes
Dividing the right hand side by D(p) = S(p) (and reorganising, recalling
So if demand is convex, then since (as we noted in the main text)
Elasticity of Supply Elasticity of Demand
, while for any log-convex
Elasticity of Supply Elasticity of Demand > 1 .
B. Non-random Rationing with No rent-seeking in the GPD Case Continuing the GPD example of Section 4, if fraction of the supply is allocated perfectly e¢ ciently among fraction of the market, (6) together with the fact that a $1 price cut increases consumer surplus by $1 per e¢ cientlyallocated unit at market-clearing, implies
So consumers gain from a price reduction i¤ > ' '
. For example, with constant-elasticity demand this requires > 
' + + (1 + 1 (1 ' ) if < 0 which simpli…es to CS 0 (p) = S(p) 1 ( ' ) + ( + )(1 ' ) if < 0:
h 1 + ' i > 0 for all < 1 if ' = 0: So, for example, with linear demand consumer surplus is enhanced by a price control however ine¢ ciently supply is allocated, if there are neither supply e¤ects nor rent-seeking costs.
C. Dynamic Model of Incumbents and Newcomers
Assume the price falls gradually from the market level, p M ; asymptoting to p M ; so the controlled price at time t is p(t) = (p M ) + e zt . Consumers leave at rate , and are replaced by new consumers with values drawn from the distribution corresponding to demand D( ), using random rationing (without rent-seeking costs) among all potential consumers who wish to purchase at that time. The continuous interest rate is r: Assume GPD demand.
The surplus gain per time-0 incumbent equals the present value (to in…n-ity) of an immediate rent reduction of less the present value of the excess above p M that is paid as prices gradually fall, that is, r+ r+ +z = z (r+ )(r+ +z)
:
The present value of price cuts, as of time t, to a newcomer who buys at time t, is r+ E. Partially Decontrolled Markets Let q i units be rationed at price p i , with p n < p n 1 < ::: < p 1 . Let the equilibrium uncontrolled market price be p 0 ; and the equilibrium e¤ort required to obtain a unit at price p i be e i . Clearly e n > e n 1 > ::: > e 1 > e 0 = 0, and consumers sort themselves so that those with costs of e¤ort c 2 (c i+1 ; c i ) buy a unit at price p i ; where c i = (p i 1 p i )=(e i e i 1 ) (de…ning c n+1 = 0), i¤ their value also exceeds p i + e i c; those with costs of e¤ort above c 1 buy an uncontrolled unit i¤ their value exceeds p 0 :
To see that there is generally a unique equilibrium for any given fp 1 ; ::; p n ; q 1 ; ::; q n g; observe that the values of all of the c i and e i can be determined sequentially from c n ; that a lower c n implies that all of the c i and e i are lower, and so also p 0 (= p 1 + e 1 c 1 ) is lower, and so (since p 0 and c 1 are both lower) increases demand for uncontrolled units but must (weakly) reduce their supply; so there is generally a unique c n for which demand equals supply and which is therefore consistent with equilibrium.
Incremental consumer surplus that would be created if all consumers who wished to could purchase at the controlled price, Incremental consumer surplus that would be created if all consumers who wished to could purchase at the controlled price,
